- Coordinator
- Centre National De La Recherche Scientifique CNRS, France
- Runs
- 1 November 2026 to 31 October 2031
- Status
- Running
- EU funding
- €2.5m
- Total cost
- —
- Partners
- 1 organisations in 1 countries
- Type
- European Research Council grant
- Grant agreement
- 101266099
What the project is doing
In the project's own words, from its summary on CORDIS.
Matching theory has transformed how societies allocate scarce resources, with successful applications in school choice, medical residencies, and kidney exchange. Yet most existing approaches treat allocation as a one-off event, while many of the most important public-sector challenges unfold dynamically, where today’s assignment shapes tomorrow’s opportunities. A prime example is the assignment of civil servants, a high-stakes process involving, in most developed countries, millions of positions each year assigned through a centralized mechanism.
This project develops the first comprehensive framework for dynamic matching, combining theoretical advances, methodological tools, and empirical applications. On the theory side, it will build new models to capture the repeated nature of assignments and develop methods to simplify complex dynamic design problems into more tractable static optimization. Building on this foundation, it will analyze how dynamic incentives—such as promising better future positions in exchange for accepting less desirable posts today—can reduce inequalities, and whether these incentives complement or substitute traditional salary instruments.
On the empirical side, the project will draw on rich French administrative data on teacher assignments, complemented by a nationwide survey, to estimate teachers’ preferences and to evaluate alternative policy designs. Counterfactual simulations will then compare the effectiveness of monetary incentives with non-monetary dynamic incentives. The project will also develop standardized protocols enabling other administrations to replicate the analyses securely.
The ultimate goal is to deliver a solid theoretical foundation together with an empirical toolbox that provides practical instruments to help policymakers design fairer and more efficient assignment systems, with direct implications for critical areas of public service worldwide.
Topics
Who is involved
| Organisation | City | Country | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Centre National De La Recherche Scientifique CNRS | Paris | France | Coordinator |
Source: CORDIS, European Commission. Data of 5 Nov 2026, reused under the Commission's reuse policy. View on CORDIS