- Coordinator
- Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
- Runs
- 1 February 2027 to 31 January 2032
- Status
- Running
- EU funding
- €1.5m
- Total cost
- €1.5m
- Partners
- 1 organisations in 1 countries
- Type
- European Research Council grant
- Grant agreement
- 101300386
What the project is doing
In the project's own words, from its summary on CORDIS.
In the wake of rising global insecurity, public and private infrastructure face increasing threats from fraudsters, organized crime, and nation-state actors. Most of our infrastructure is now digital or digitally controlled, and cryptography underpins its security. If we could prove that cryptographic building blocks are secure, then this would put cryptography on solid foundations and make its design process more efficient.
Moreover, it would bar unexpected cryptanalytic breakthroughs from wiping out current constructions. Ruling out such black swan events is the holy grail of security. Unfortunately, security arguments have been held back by a lack of rigorous foundations. Historically, symmetric cryptography often relied on false assumptions. This led to errors and prevented ruling out even known attack methods. Moreover, the current security analysis paradigm rests on a dangerously narrow set of pointwise and pairwise techniques that rely on counting inputs and outputs, or pairs of inputs and outputs, satisfying certain conditions.
In the last five years, I introduced a theory of cryptanalysis known as the geometric approach. It provides common foundations for pointwise and pairwise methods, avoids false assumptions and leads to new techniques. The goal of RECRYPT is to prevent black swan events by expanding the security analysis beyond pointwise and pairwise attack methods, and by replacing current cat-and-mouse dynamics between designers and attackers by rigorous security arguments at design time.
Building on the geometric approach, I will rule out a broad class of pointwise and pairwise attack methods that includes current techniques. I will extend the foundations of the field using new mathematical tools to introduce a new generation of t-wise methods. Finally, I will develop new design strategies that lead to security arguments against these methods. These arguments will also allow us to rule out broader classes of pointwise and pairwise methods.
Topics
Who is involved
| Organisation | City | Country | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Katholieke Universiteit Leuven | Leuven | Belgium | Coordinator |
Source: CORDIS, European Commission. Data of 5 Nov 2026, reused under the Commission's reuse policy. View on CORDIS · Grant DOI